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WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
The government of the United States has been emphatically
termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly
cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no
remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.'
INTRODUCTION
Circuit courts have recently held that § 1396a(a)(8) of the
Medicaid Act' grants eligible Medicaid recipients an enforceable
right, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to receive medical assistance
(Medicaid benefits) with reasonable promptness. Questions
regarding the remedies available under this enforceable right to
medical assistance, however, remain in contention among these
courts. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
recently acknowledged a split among sister circuits as to how to
define "medical assistance."' More specifically, these circuit
decisions differ on the issue of whether a state must provide an
eligible Medicaid recipient with the actual medical services to which
she is entitled, or merely provide her with the funding for those
medical services.4
Establishing an enforceable right to receive Medicaid benefits
accomplishes little until courts are willing to inquire into the
appropriate remedy following the breach of such a right. Sabree v.
Richman demonstrated the inefficiency of courts not determining
the appropriate remedy. In Sabree, a class of mentally retarded
adults sued the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for failing to
provide them with intermediate care facility services for which they
qualified under the Medicaid Act.5 The court held that the plaintiffs
1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) (2000).
3. Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180, 181 n.1 (3d Cir. 2004).
4. Id. This Note will not discuss any cases in which courts determined that a federally
enforceable right to Medicaid does not exist. It is not this Note's purpose to analyze the
propriety of a federally enforceable right to Medicaid. This Note focuses solely on the remedy
available to a Medicaid recipient once a court finds that such a right does exist. For an
argument espousing the view that a federally enforceable right to Medicaid should not exist,
see Mark Andrew Ison, Note, Two Wrongs Don't Make a Right: Medicaid, Section 1983 and
the Cost of an Enforceable Right to Health Care, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1479 (2003).
5. Sabree, 367 F.3d at 181.
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had an enforceable right to receive the medical assistance in
question; it did not, however, grant the plaintiffs a remedy and
instead remanded the case so that the district court could define
"medical assistance."6
This Note explores the issue of how to interpret "medical assis-
tance" as used in the Medicaid Act, considers the different remedies
that courts have used, and, combining the differing approaches,
suggests how this issue should be settled. Part I provides a brief
overview of Medicaid in the United States, with a more specific
discussion of the Medicaid waiver provision. Part II discusses the
evolution of § 1983 jurisprudence, which established the individual
right to enforce constitutional and statutory laws against the State.
Part III describes two circuit court cases that held that § 1983
establishes an enforceable right to Medicaid benefits for eligible
individuals, and Part IV analyzes the remedies that those two
courts provided. Part V introduces the current circuit split regard-
ing how "medical assistance"-as used in § 1396a(a)(8)-should be
interpreted. This interpretation determines the ultimate remedy in
cases considering the issue of individual enforceability of the
Medicaid Act. Finally, Part VI explores the differing views on the
proper definition of "medical assistance," and makes suggestions for
how courts should ultimately decide this issue. The outcome will
largely rest on the distinction between waiver and non-waiver
Medicaid programs, as well as the individual facts of each case.
I. OVERVIEW OF MEDICAID
Congress passed Title XIX of the Social Security Act, commonly
known as the "Medicaid Act,"7 in 1965 "as a modest legislative
companion to Medicare."8 Today, Medicaid is the largest means-
tested entitlement law in the United States.9 The purpose of the
Medicaid Act was to establish "a cooperative federal-state program
6. Id. at 194. "To resolve this issue we need not, and do not, address the remedy that
might be available to plaintiffs, but leave that to the District Court in the first instance." Id.
at 181 n.1.
7. See, e.g., id. at 182 (using the common name of the Act).
8. Sara Rosenbaum & David Rousseau, Medicaid at Thirty-Five, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
7, 8 (2001). The Medicaid Act is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396v (2000).
9. Rosenbaum & Rousseau, supra note 8, at 16.
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under which the federal government furnishes funding to states for
the purpose of providing medical assistance to eligible low-income
persons." ° States have the option of choosing whether to participate
in the program; once a state accepts federal funding through the
program, however, it is required to comply with the Medicaid Act
and all accompanying federal regulations." If a state fails to abide
by the rules set forth in the Medicaid Act or in the accompanying
regulations, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS)
must discontinue all federal funding to which the state is entitled
under its Medicaid program."i
There is, however, an exception to this rule of strict compliance.
In 1981, Congress passed a law known as the Medicaid Waiver
Provision.'" Under this provision, a state can ask the Secretary of
HHS for approval to include within its Medicaid program home-
and community-based services-such as nursing home services,
habilitation services, and respite care-that are otherwise not
within the realm of the Medicaid Act. 4 If approved, many of the
strict requirements of the Medicaid Act are waived in order to give
the state flexibility in implementing the program. 5 More specifi-
cally, waiver programs do not have to be in place statewide or be
available to all individuals equally.'6 For example, a state, if it
wishes, may request that its waiver program be limited to twenty
potential participants. The purpose of waiver programs is "to allow
10. Pa. Pharmacists Ass'n v. Houston, 283 F.3d 531, 533 (3d Cir. 2002).
11. See §§ 1396, 1396a(a)(1); see also Sabree, 367 F.3d at 182; Rosenbaum & Rousseau,
supra note 8, at 17. The applicable federal regulations are contained within Chapter 42 of the
Code of Federal Regulations and were enacted by the Secretary of Health and Human
Services. See, e.g., Sabree, 367 F.3d at 182. Every state has implemented a Medicaid
program. See Cindy Mann & Tim Westmoreland, Attending to Medicaid, 32 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 416, 419 (2004).
12. See § 1396c.
13. §§ 1315, 1396n; see also Bryson v. Shumway, 308 F.3d 79, 82 (1st Cir. 2002)
(discussing Medicaid waiver provisions); Andrew I. Batavia, A Right to Personal Assistance
Services: "Most Integrated Setting Appropriate" Requirements and the Independent Living
Model of Long-Term Care, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 17, 24 (2001) (discussing the adoption of
Medicaid waiver programs).
14. See § 1396n(c); Bryson, 308 F.3d at 82.
15. See § 1396n(c); Bryson, 308 F.3d at 82; Batavia, supra note 13, at 24.
16. Bryson, 308 F.3d at 82.
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states to experiment with methods of care," 7 and "to alter the
institutional bias of the Medicaid program." 8
Courts have held recently that Medicaid recipients have an
enforceable right to receive the benefits entitled to them. 9 This
enforceable right is derived from 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which was
originally enacted as the Civil Rights Act of 1871. The next Part of
this Note discusses § 1983.
II. SECTION 1983 AND ENFORCEABLE INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
A. Civil Rights Act of 1871
After the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment,2 ° Congress was
left with the responsibility of providing a way for the Amendment
to be enforced. Congress did so by enacting the Civil Rights Act of
1871, later codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983.21 Courts, however, were
slow to define the scope of § 1983.22 It was ninety years before the
17. Id.
18. Batavia, supra note 13, at 24.
19. See infra Part II.
20. Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment states that "[n]either slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
21. Section 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (originally enacted as Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat.
13); see Christopher J. Pettit, The Evolution of Government Liability Under Section 1983,24
ST. MARY'S L.J. 145, 146 (1992) (discussing Congress's motivation in the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871).
22. See Comment, The Civil Rights Act: Emergence of an Adequate Federal Civil
Remedy?, 26 IND. L.J. 361, 363 (1950) ("The volume of private litigation under the Third Civil
Rights Act and the degree of success achieved have been small until relatively recent years.
From 1871 until 1920 no case involving Section 47(3) has been discovered and only twenty-
one cases were decided under Section 43." [The relevant language of Section 47(3) and
Section 43 of the Third Civil Rights is now reflected in § 1983.]). For a comprehensive
discussion of § 1983 jurisprudence, see Sasha Samberg-Champion, Note, How to Read
Gonzag: Laying the Seeds of a Coherent Section 1983 Jurisprudence, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
1838, 1841-57 (2003).
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Supreme Court established that states could be liable to individuals
for violations of federal constitutional rights under § 1983.23
In 1980, the Supreme Court recognized that § 1983 may also be
used against state actors to enforce rights created by federal
statutes, rather than just those rights created by the Constitution.24
In Maine v. Thiboutot, the Court justified extending the applicabil-
ity of § 1983 to statutes-in this case the Social Security Act
(SSA)-because "the SSA afford[ed] no private right of action
against a State." 5 Through a series of cases following Maine v.
Thiboutot, the Supreme Court has developed a standard for
determining when a party may hold a state liable under § 1983.
B. Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman
In 1981, the Supreme Court confronted the issue of whether
a developmentally disabled plaintiff could bring a cause of
action under § 1983 against the State for alleged violations of the
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act.26 The
district court had found that the conditions at Pennhurst (a facility
owned and operated by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania)27 were
dangerous.28 The district court ultimately held that the plaintiff had
the right to sue under § 1983 to enforce his "Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment right to freedom from harm."29
23. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-72 (1961).
It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed was to afford
a federal right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion,
neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the
claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immunities
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by the state
agencies.
Id. at 180.
24. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 5 (1980). City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808,
829-30 (1966), observed that under § 1983 state "officers may be made to respond in damages
not only for violations of rights conferred by federal equal civil rights laws, but for violations
of other federal constitutional and statutory rights as well."' Id.
25. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 6.
26. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1981).
27. Id. at 5.
28. Haldermanv. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295,1308 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
29. Id. at 1320.
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The Supreme Court disagreed with the district court's decision
and held that for an individual to have a private cause of action
against a state under § 1983, Congress must have "unambiguously,"
and "with a clear voice," intended limitations on state funding for
failing to meet certain standards.3"
C. Blessing v. Freestone
In 1997, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of state liability
under § 1983 in a case in which several mothers sued the State for
not taking adequate steps to ensure that the fathers of their
children complied with Title IV-D of the Social Security Act by
paying child support. 31 The petitioners claimed that Title IV-D
bestowed on them an individually enforceable right to receive child
support.32 The Supreme Court disagreed."3 The Court stated that it
was not enough for the petitioners to claim a violation of federal
law; rather, they had to claim that their federal rights were
violated.'4
The Supreme Court went on to outline a three-pronged test to
determine "whether a particular statutory provision gives rise to a
federal right."" First, when Congress enacted a statutory provision
it must have intended for the provision to benefit the plaintiff.'"
Second, the federal right in question must not be "so 'vague and
amorphous' that its enforcement would strain judicial compe-
tence."'7 And third, "the statute must unambiguously impose a
30. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17. The Court stated that the purpose of the Developmentally
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act was "'to assist' the States through the use of
federal grants to improve the care and treatment of the mentally retarded," not to impose
an obligation on the states. Id. at 18.
31. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 357 (1997).
32. Id. at 332-33.
33. Id. at 333.
34. Id. at 340 ("In order to seek redress through § 1983, however, a plaintiff must assert
the violation of a federal right, not merely a violation of federal law."); see also Golden State
Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989) ("Section 1983 speaks in terms
of 'rights, privileges, or immunities,' not violations of federal law.").
35. Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340-41.
36. Id. at 340.
37. Id. at 340-41 (quoting Wright v. Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 431
(1987)).
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binding obligation on the States."' The Court further explained this
third prong by asserting that the federal right must be stated in
"mandatory, rather than precatory," language.3 9
D. Gonzaga University v. Doe
In 2002, the Supreme Court was faced with determining whether
a provision of the Family Education Rights and Privacy Act of 1974
(FERPA), which prohibits the federal government from funding
schools that release educational records to unauthorized persons,
conferred a federal right upon the plaintiff.4° The Court stated that
its purpose for reviewing the case was to clear up "confusion [that]
ha[d] led some courts to interpret Blessing as allowing plaintiffs to
enforce a statute under § 1983 so long as the plaintiff falls within
the general zone of interest that the statute is intended to
protect."4' In other words, the Court refined the first prong of the
Blessing test. Now, in addition to congressional intent to benefit the
plaintiff, the rights must be "unambiguously conferred"42 on the
plaintiff by "rights-creating language"4 comprising "individually
focused terminology. 44
The Court held that FERPA did not unambiguously confer
federally enforceable rights on the plaintiff under § 1983. 4' The
Court was especially concerned with ensuring that § 1983 was only
applied to situations in which a statute was written specifically to
benefit the plaintiff.46 The statute before the Court used the
language "[n]o funds shall be made available," rather than "individ-
ually focused terminology" such as "[n]o person ... shall ... be
38. Id. at 341.
39. Id. For an explanation ofthe difference between mandatory and precatory terms, see
Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 510-12 (1990) (suggesting that precatory
terms are used when "Congress intend[s] only to indicate a preference for 'appropriate
treatment,"' and that mandatory terms are used when Congress "ma[kesj compliance with
the provision a condition of receipt of federal funding").
40. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 276 (2002).
41. Id. at 278, 283.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 274.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 283-84.
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subjected to discrimination."47 In other words, the language that
Congress used in FERPA shows an intent to benefit a general class
of people to whom the plaintiff happened to belong. It does not show
an intent to unambiguously confer an individual right on the
plaintiff.48
As a result of these cases, "[s]ection 1983 lawsuits have become
a powerful weapon for forcing states to comply with both constitu-
tional and statutory requirements. 49 Plaintiffs only recently began
using § 1983 to bring claims under the Medicaid Act.
III. MEDICAID AS AN ENFORCEABLE RIGHT UNDER § 1983
As a result of the Supreme Court cases from Thiboutot to
Gonzaga, circuit courts now have clear guidance in determining
whether a federally enforceable individual right exists under
§ 1983. Courts must decide whether the statute in question (1)
unambiguously confers a right to the plaintiff, using rights-creating
language comprising individually focused terminology; (2) is not
vague or amorphous; and (3) imposes an unambiguous, binding
obligation on the states.50 Within the past several years, courts have
been asked to determine whether a federally enforceable right to
Medicaid exists for certain persons. This part of the Note will
provide a brief discussion of two cases in which the courts found, by
focusing on the above-mentioned factors, that such a right exists.
The Medicaid Act5" provides in § 1396a(a)(8) that "[a] State plan
for medical assistance must ... provide that all individuals wishing
to make application for medical assistance under the plan shall
have opportunity to do so, and that such assistance shall be
furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals."52
Most plaintiffs have based their claims on the "reasonable prompt-
ness" provision; the typical theory plaintiffs advance is that they
did not receive "medical assistance"-to which they are legally
47. Id. at 287 (internal quotation marks omitted).
48. For a discussion on rights-creating language, see Samberg-Champion, supra note 22,
at 1854-55.
49. Id. at 1841.
50. See discussion supra Part II.B-D.
51. Social Security Act tit. XIX, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396v (2000).
52. § 1396a(a)(8).
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entitled under § 1983-with reasonable promptness.53 It is impor-
tant, therefore, to keep in mind when analyzing these cases that the
reasonable promptness claims are based on the premise that the
plaintiff is owed the medical assistance in question within a
reasonably prompt time because § 1983 gives her a right to enforce
§ 1396a(a)(8) of the Medicaid Act.
A. Eleventh Circuit: Doe v. Chiles
In Doe v. Chiles,54 a group of developmentally disabled individu-
als sued the State of Florida because they were not granted access
to an intermediate care facility within a reasonably prompt time.55
The plaintiffs were eligible Medicaid recipients who claimed they
had a right to receive access to the facility based on § 1396a(a)(8),
which was enforceable through § 1983.56
The facility in question was part of a program designed to provide
care for individuals with "sufficiently severe mental retardation and
related conditions."57 The State deemed the plaintiffs eligible to
take part in the program, yet, instead of being admitted into the
facility, the plaintiffs were put on a waiting list.5" The plaintiffs'
complaint alleged that they had been on the waiting list for more
than five years and were still being denied access to the facility.
59
As a result, they filed suit alleging that the State had failed to
provide them with Medicaid benefits within a reasonably prompt
time period. 0 The defendants acknowledged in their initial brief
that there were serious delays getting eligible recipients admitted
to the facility." The problem was, the defendants contended, that
the State of Florida was financially unable to provide access to the
53. See, e.g., Sara Rosenbaum, Joel Teitelbaum & Alexandra Stewart, Olmstead v. L.C.:
Implications for Medicaid and Other Publicly Funded Health Services, 12 HEALTH MATRIX
93, 127 (2002) (discussing the "reasonable promptness" standard).
54. 136 F.3d 709 (11th Cir. 1998).
55. Id. at 711.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 711 n.2 (interpreting 42 C.F.R. § 483.440(a)(1)-(2) (1996)).
58. Id. at 711. The program was not a waiver program; the service therefore had to be
"sufficient in amount, duration, and scope." 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(b) (2004).
59. Chiles, 136 F.3d at 711.
60. See id.
61. Id.
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facility to all of the people who qualified for such access." The
State's defense relied on the notion that the Medicaid Act does not
give recipients an enforceable federal right under § 1983.3
In deciding whether the § 1396a(a)(8) requirement to provide
medical assistance with reasonable promptness conferred an
individually enforceable right under § 1983, the court applied the
three-pronged Blessing test.6 First, the court had to determine
whether Congress "intended that the provision in question benefit
the plaintiff."65 It found that "[tihe plain language of the provision's
reasonable promptness clause is clearly intended to benefit
Medicaid-'eligible individuals'-such as the [plaintiffs] in this
case." 6 Second, the court found that the statute was "not so vague
and amorphous that its enforcement would strain judicial compe-
tence."67 Third, the court determined that § 1396a(a)(8) "unambigu-
ously impose[d] a binding obligation"' on the State of Florida.6" As
a result, the court held that the plaintiffs "ha[d] a federal right to
reasonably prompt provision of assistance under section 1396a(a)(8)
of the Medicaid Act, and that this right [was] enforceable under
section 1983.' '69
B. First Circuit: Bryson v. Shumway
In Bryson v. Shumway,7 ° the First Circuit was asked to decide
whether § 1396a(a)(8) conferred a federal right to reasonably
prompt services under § 1983.71 The State of New Hampshire had
62. Reply Brief of Appellants at 19-20, Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709 (11th Cir. 1998) (No.
96-5144).
63. Chiles, 136 F.3d at 712.
64. Id. at 715-19. This case was decided before Gonzaga; the Eleventh Circuit's decision,
however, would not change after Gonzaga because the statute in question unambiguously
confers a right to the plaintiff, using rights-creating language comprising individually
focused terminology. "A State plan ... must ... provide ... medical assistance ... [which] shall
be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals." § 1396a(a)(8) (emphasis
added).
65. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997).
66. Chiles, 136 F.3d at 715.
67. Id. at 718.
68. Id. (quoting Blessing, 520 U.S. at 341).
69. Id. at 719.
70. 308 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2002).
71. Id. at 83-84.
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created a waiver program within its Medicaid program that gave
people with acquired brain disorders the option to receive special-
ized medical care. 2 The waiver program had slots available for
fifteen individuals in 1993, its first year of existence.73 The State
increased the number of available slots each year, ultimately
reaching 130 slots by the time the Bryson plaintiffs sued.74 In each
year of the program's existence, there were more applicants than
slots available.76
The plaintiffs, representing a class of similarly situated individu-
als, had been diagnosed with acquired brain disorders and were
eligible to partake in the waiver program.76 Plaintiffs applied for
the program and were put on the waiting list, where they remained
until the time that they filed suit.77 As in Chiles, the complaint
alleged that the State failed to provide Medicaid services with
"reasonable promptness" as required by § 1396a(a)(8). 7' The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and
required the State to provide the waiver services to the plaintiff
class within twelve months."v
The circuit court, with Gonzaga in mind, applied the three-
pronged Blessing test in a manner similar to the manner in which
the Chiles court applied the test."° The First Circuit found that §
1396a(a)(8), "on its face, does intend to benefit the plaintiffs,""1 that
the "right conferred is not vague or amorphous,"" and that it
"unambiguously bind[s] the states."' In fact, the court cited Chiles
in making this determination.' In sum, the court found that the
plaintiffs had an individually enforceable right to the services
72. Id. at 81.
73. Id. at 83.
74. Id.
75. Id. ("The waiting list has ranged from 25 people in the first year to a height of 87
people in the 1997-1998 year.").
76. Id. at 81.
77. Id. at 83.
78. Id. at 83-84.
79. Id. at 84.
80. See id. at 88-89.
81. Id. at 88.
82. Id. at 89.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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provided by the waiver program under § 1983 within a reasonably
prompt time, as required by § 1396a(a)(8).85
IV. INITIAL REMEDIES
Both Chiles and Bryson held that the State must provide
Medicaid assistance to eligible individuals within a reasonably
prompt time period." The courts were then left with the task of
interpreting "assistance." There were two options they could have
chosen: assistance as funding for services, or assistance as the
actual provision of services. Both courts adopted the latter view.
In affirming the district court's decision,87 the Chiles court
"enjoined the [state] officials from failing to provide the assistance
within a 'reasonable' time period, not to exceed ninety days.""8 This
court clarified any confusion regarding the definition of assistance
when it reiterated the district court's statement that .'[miedical
assistance under the [Medicaid] plan' has been defined as medical
services."" In his concurring opinion, Judge Barkett eliminated
any residual ambiguity on this issue by stating that "[s]ection
1396a(a)(8) not only requires States, as a condition of federal
funding, to have a plan for medical assistance providing that such
assistance will be provided with reasonable promptness, it also
imposes a substantive duty on States to provide medical assistance
with reasonable promptness." ° As a result, the State was required
-within ninety days-to expand the intermediate care facilities
to accommodate the eligible developmentally disabled individuals.
Like the Eleventh Circuit, the First Circuit, in Bryson, held that
eligible individuals have an enforceable right to receive Medicaid
assistance with reasonable promptness.9' Unlike Chiles, however,
Bryson involved a waiver program-hence giving people with
85. Id.
86. See supra Part III.A-B.
87. Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709, 723 (11th Cir. 1998).
88. Id. at 711.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 723 (Barkett, J., concurring). This statement came after the court defined
"medical assistance" as "medical services." It is clear, therefore, that "medical assistance" in
this quotation refers to the provision of services.
91. Bryson v. Shumway, 308 F.3d 79, 89 (1st Cir. 2002).
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acquired brain disorders the option to receive specialized medical
care.92 HHS granted New Hampshire's request that the program
consist of 130 slots.93 New Hampshire officials had decided,
however, to fill fewer than the 130 allotted slots, leaving some
vacancies.94 The court ruled that the plaintiff class had a statutory
right, under § 1396a(a)(8), to receive the medical services provided
in the waiver program as long as slots were available.95 Bryson
interprets "medical assistance" as "medical services," although not
explicitly. For example, the court did not state that the plaintiffs
had a statutory right to receive medical assistance in the form of
payment for medical services they were entitled to receive under
Medicaid. Rather, it held that the plaintiffs had a right to receive
medical assistance in the form of the actual services provided
within the waiver program.96
Although Bryson involved a waiver program, the potential
problems with defining "medical assistance" as "medical services"
remain the same. In fact, they can be even worse. Suppose State X
adopts a waiver program. State X plans on starting the program
with fifty people, but in its request to HHS, it asks for a cap of 100
people. State Xrequests this limit with the hope that it will be able
to find additional resources to put toward the program in order to
accommodate more than fifty people. As it turns out, however, State
X can only afford to include fifty people. The program proves to be
extremely successful and leads to new and innovative ways to
provide care. A plaintiff class then claims that it has a federal
statutory right under § 1396a(a)(8) to receive the medical services
provided in the waiver program. Under Bryson's holding, State X
would be required to fill the unused slots with these plaintiffs. The
waiver program could then go bankrupt due to the price of provid-
ing these additional services. As a result of defining "medical
assistance" as "medical services," the possible development of a new
92. See id. at 81.
93. See id. at 83.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 89.
96. See id. at 89-90.
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and innovative medical care system-under this hypothetical-
would be destroyed.s7
The Eleventh and First Circuits, as seen in Chiles and Bryson,
applied a definition of medical assistance that required the actual
provision of services, rather than the provision of funding for
services. This definition seems appropriate to the facts of those
cases. As will be seen in Part V, however, this will not always be the
case.
V. THE EMERGENCE OF A SPLIT
A. Seventh Circuit: Bruggeman v. Blagojevich
In Bruggeman v. Blagojevich,98 the Seventh Circuit was pre-
sented with the issue of applying § 1983 to § 1396a(a)(8). This court,
however, took a different approach at the remedy stage. The court's
focus, with respect to issues relevant to this discussion, was not on
whether an enforceable right to Medicaid exists under § 1983,"9 but
on the appropriate meaning of "assistance."'00
In Bruggeman, the plaintiffs were Chicago Medicaid recipients
who were developmentally disabled adults eligible to live in
"Intermediate Care Facilities for the Developmentally Disabled,"'
and who then lived with their parents. The problem was that most
of the facilities were located far from where the plaintiffs and their
parents lived.' This, the plaintiffs claimed, would cause their
parents to incur extra travel expenses when their parents wished
97. It is true in this hypothetical that in the years that State X wishes to expand its
waiver program to more people, it could simply reapply for a new waiver program with a
higher cap on the number of people that it can accommodate. This approach, however, seems
impractical considering the additional administrative burdens that would be placed on the
state. See 42 C.F.R. § 441.300-.303 (2004).
98. 324 F.3d 906 (7th Cir. 2003).
99. In fact, the court did not look into this issue at all. Instead, its decision was based on
the assumption that such a right does, in fact, exist. See id. at 910. "The statutory
entitlement to reasonable promptness of medical services ... is not infringed by the
maldistribution ... of [intermediate care facilities] across the state." Id.
100. See id.
101. Id. at 908.
102. See id.
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to visit them. °3 The plaintiffs, therefore, sued; they asked the court
to require state officials to build facilities closer to Chicago so that
the plaintiffs could exercise their right to receive Medicaid. °4 They
requested that this assistance be provided with reasonable
promptness.'0 5
The court held that the plaintiffs' right to reasonable medical
assistance under the Medicaid Act was not violated by the unfavor-
able placement of the facilities. 06 The court went on to state:
[TJhe statutory reference to "assistance" appears to have
reference to financial assistance rather than to actual medical
services, though the distinction was missed in Bryson v.
Shumway and Doe v. Chiles. Medicaid is a payment scheme, not
a scheme for state-provided medical assistance, as through
state-owned hospitals. The regulations that implement the
provision indicate that what is required is a prompt determina-
tion of eligibility and prompt provision of funds to eligible
individuals to enable them to obtain the covered medical
services that they need; a requirement of prompt treatment
would amount to a direct regulation of medical services. 10 7
As is clear from this analysis, the court did not require the State to
provide medical services to the plaintiffs. Instead, according to this
decision, states are only responsible for making a prompt decision
regarding a person's eligibility for Medicaid, and then for promptly
providing that person with the funds necessary for her to receive
the services that she needs. This approach conforms with the
traditional insurance approach to Medicaid.08
There are drawbacks to this approach. Public health clinics,
hospitals, or agencies could have an incentive to abuse the Medicaid
system. A state, for example, could choose to open a facility that
provides services that are optional under the Medicaid Act.0 9 This
103. Id. at 908-09.
104. Id.
105. See id. at 909.
106. See id. at 910.
107. Id. (citations omitted) (referring to 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.911(a), .930(a)-(b) (2004)).
108. See infra text accompanying note 124 (discussing characterization of Medicaid as an
insurance program).
109. See infra text accompanying notes 129-32 (discussing the optional nature of the
Medicaid program).
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facility could be designed so that it only accommodates a small
number of people. The state would then qualify for the benefits that
are provided to states under the Medicaid Act.11 There could be
many people, however, that qualify for this program, but who are
unable to participate because of its minimal size. According to
Bruggeman, the state's only obligation at this point would be to
provide funding to these people if they are able to receive the same
services elsewhere. If no other facilities exist, however, qualifying
people will be left with no remedy, despite the fact that the state
continues to receive federal benefits.
B. The Third Circuit and the Recognition of the Split: Sabree v.
Richman
In Sabree v. Richman,"' the Third Circuit held that a class of
mentally retarded adults had a federal right, pursuant to § 1983, to
receive medical assistance under the Medicaid Act from an
intermediate care facility with reasonable promptness." 2 In
considering a remedy for the plaintiffs, the court recognized the
current circuit split regarding whether "assistance" refers to
services or to payment for services.13 The court decided not to
resolve this issue, and clearly stated so: "[t]o resolve this issue we
need not, and do not, address the remedy that might be available to
plaintiffs, but leave that to the District Court in the first
instance."" 4 This statement clearly shows the inherent danger of
courts failing to specify the meaning of the term "medical assis-
tance." District courts, with nothing to guide them, are left to devise
clever solutions to a problem that the circuit courts have recognized,
but have walked away from. Without guiding precedent, district
courts will have varying solutions. Public healthcare service
110. See supra text accompanying notes 10-12 (discussing federal funding to states).
111. 367 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2004).
112. Id. at 181-82, 193-94 ("Congress clearly and unambiguously conferred the rights of
which plaintiffs have allegedly been deprived by Pennsylvania, and has not precluded
individual enforcement of those rights.!).
113. Id. at 181 n.1 ("There appears to be a disagreement among our sister courts of
appeals as to whether, pursuant to Medicaid, a state must merely provide financial
assistance to obtain covered services, or provide the services themselves." (citing Bruggeman
v. Blagojevich, 324 F.3d 906, 910 (7th Cir. 2003))).
114. Id.
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providers and Medicaid recipients could have differing rights
depending upon their location.
VI. PROPOSAL
This Part of the Note will explore how courts should handle
interpreting the term "medical assistance." The Bruggeman court
opened up the door to future inquiry about the issue; the court
did not, however, offer a solution.115 As a result, this issue may
continually distract courts as they try to establish an appropriate
standard that can be applied to similar cases. On the other hand,
courts, like the Sabree court, may leave the issue unresolved."'
This approach would ignore the fact that the plaintiffs in these
cases are real people, who are eligible for Medicaid benefits, but
who are not receiving the medical help that they may desperately
require. Unnecessary and prolonged litigation does not serve justice
to these individuals. Thus, it is important for courts to quickly
resolve the issue in order to remove this debate from courtrooms.
This Part of the Note will ultimately conclude that, in the typical
Medicaid scenario," 7 "medical assistance" should be defined as just
that: medical assistance. Because cases are fact specific, courts
should not try to develop a test that can be applied to all situations
in which this issue arises; courts should look instead at the facts of
each particular case to determine whether the plaintiffs should
receive funding or be provided with services. In scenarios involving
waivers, however, a state should not be required to provide medical
services. Requiring the provision of services in these scenarios could
counteract the very benefits that were envisioned in the creation of
the waiver exception.'
A. Looking for the True Meaning of "Medical Assistance"
An exhaustive search for the true definition of "medical assis-
tance" is likely to result in disappointment. The term "true
definition" is used here because one might argue that a definition
115. See supra Part V.A.
116. See supra Part V.B.
117. -Typical Medicaid scenario" refers to non-waiver cases.
118. See infra Part VI.C.
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does exist. The practical use of the term "medical assistance,"
however, has led to differing views of its meaning. 'Medical
assistance" is defined in the Medicaid Act as "payment of part or all
of the cost of [enumerated] care and services." '119 If, however, a state
elects to participate in the Medicaid program, the state must
comply with all accompanying regulatory and statutory regu-
lations.120 Chapter 42 of the Code of Federal Regulations refers to
services that states must provide. For example, a state plan must
ensure that categorically needy people receive certain services, 121 or
if the medically needy are included within the state's plan, that
they receive certain services. 122 It is important, therefore, to look at
not only the Medicaid Act when addressing this issue, but also to
look at the regulations that control the administration of the Act.
By doing this, one can easily read the term "medical assistance" to
encompass a requirement for the provision of services. The meaning
of the phrase "medical assistance," therefore, can vary from one
case to another.
Each of the two differing views of "medical assistance" possesses
valuable aspects, 123 and arguments can be made in support of each.
Medicaid is typically characterized as a medical insurance or
financing program. 124 It is this characterization that leads many to
119. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
120. See § 1396a(a)(1); 42 C.F.R. § 430.10 (2004).
121. 42 C.F.R. § 440.210. For example, "[a] State plan must specify that, at a minimum,
categorically needy recipients are furnished ... [p]regnancy-related services and services for
other conditions that might complicate the pregnancy." § 440.210(a)(2).
122. 42 C.F.R. § 440.220. For example, "[a] State plan that includes the medically needy
must specify that the medically needy are provided, as a minimum ... [hiome health services
(§ 440.70) to any individual entitled to skilled nursing facility services." § 440.220(a)(3).
123. It is clear that the Seventh Circuit views "medical assistance" as the provision of
funding for medical services. See Bruggeman v. Blagojevich, 324 F.3d 906, 910 (7th Cir.
2003). The Eleventh and First Circuits' definition of"medical assistance" is not stated in such
clear terms. See Bryson v. Shumway, 308 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2002); Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709
(11th Cir. 1998). The logical application of their rulings, however, requires that "medical
assistance" be equated with the provision of medical services. See supra Part IV.
124. See Lisa B. Deutsch, Medicaid Payment for Organ Transplants: The Extent of
Mandated Coverage, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 185, 187 (1997) ("Where is wide latitude
for each state to determine which of its citizens qualify for this form of insurance and which
services the program will provide."); Mann & Westmoreland, supra note 11, at 416-17
("Medicaid is now the largest single insurer in the United States in terms of the number of
beneficiaries enrolled and dollars spent.... Medicaid is also the most heterogeneous insurance
program in the country."); Rosenbaum & Rousseau, supra note 8, at 7 ("Medicaid [is] the
nation's largest means-tested health care financing program."); Rosenbaum, Teitelbaum &
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the logical conclusion that Medicaid, as an insurance provider, is
only meant to provide funding for services. Although this assertion
is probably the most obvious way to view Medicaid (and, therefore,
the most obvious way to view "medical assistance"), it is not the
only way to do so. By looking at certain aspects of the Medicaid Act
and applying them to real-world scenarios, one can make a strong
argument in support of the idea that states should be required to
provide services to eligible recipients. The two main aspects of the
Medicaid Act that are referred to here are the states' receipt of
federal funding and the optional nature of the Medicaid program.
First, states receive federal funding to help cover the costs
associated with providing "medical assistance.""5 In fact, states
receive fifty to seventy-seven percent of Medicaid benefits costs
from federal funds,12 6 with poor states receiving the most federal
funds.12 7 It is apparent that a state, especially a poor one, may have
a large incentive to adopt a Medicaid program. In fact, most states
depend on Medicaid funding to meet their overall cost of medical
care.
128
Second, Medicaid is an optional program in which states choose
to participate. 129 Once a state decides to participate in Medicaid, it
must provide certain mandatory benefits and can also choose to
provide additional optional benefits. 130 Once a state chooses to
provide an optional benefit, it must provide it equally to all of those
who are eligible for the benefit.'3 ' The reason for the distinction
between mandatory and optional benefits is based on financial
Stewart, supra note 53, at 125 ("Medicaid functions as a health insurance program ....")
125. See supra Part I.
126. SeeMann & Westmoreland, supra note 11, at 419 ('States are responsible for twenty-
three to fifty percent of Medicaid benefit costs.").
127. Id. at 419 n.47.
128. Rosenbaum & Rousseau, supra note 8, at 14-15 ("Because Medicaid expenditures
comprise the majority of total state spending on health care, this level of federal financial
participation provides major aid to states in meeting the overall cost of medical care, which
is by far the fastest growing portion of their public welfare budgets.").
129. See supra Part I.
130. For a list of common optional and mandatory benefits, see ANDY SCHNEIDER ET AL.,
THE MEDICAID RESOURCE BOOK 50,53,55-57 (Kaiser Comm'n on Medicaid & the Uninsured
ed., 2002), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/2236-index.cfm (follow "Chapter 2:
Medicaid Benefits" hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 31, 2006). See also Rosenbaum & Rousseau,
supra note 8, at 20-21 (discussing required and optional benefits).
131. See supra Part I.
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considerations. Some benefits-such as community-based long-term
care-are optional because a state may not be able to afford to
provide them to all eligible recipients. 3 The state, therefore, has
a choice: provide optional benefits and incur the expenses that
accompany them or provide no optional benefits at all.
Considering these two factors together, one could argue that it
would be better to define "medical assistance" as the provision of
actual services rather than as funding for those services. Because
a state makes a decision to provide medical assistance for certain
sets of benefits, coupled with the fact that it is receiving financial
benefits for doing so, it should be required to provide the assistance
across the board.' 33 In other words, if a state chooses to include a
certain benefit under its Medicaid program and accepts federal
funds for doing so, then it should ensure that all eligible recipients
receive that benefit. When all recipients are able to receive the
benefit by obtaining required services from a public or private
source, the state would then merely have to provide the funding for
that benefit. This would be a typical scenario in which Medicaid
acts as insurance. If, however, some eligible recipients are unable
to receive the benefit, then the state should be required to provide
132. See, e.g., Mann & Westmoreland, supra note 11, at 419. The authors note that
the lack of community-based long-term care services funded by Medicaid is a
consequence of funding pressures and priorities. Medicaid law requires states
to offer nursing home services to eligible beneficiaries, but home- and
community-based long-term care services are not required. This imbalance
between institutional and community-based services is not an oversight. It is
a reflection that states believe they cannot afford the costs if these services
were opened up to all who qualify.
Id.
133. See id. at 417.
There are many facets of the entitlement---consequences that flow from the
simple directive that all eligible people must be enrolled. Most notable, perhaps,
is Medicaid's open-ended financing structure, which is tied closely to the
entitlement. The longstanding arrangement under Medicaid is that in exchange
for taking on the obligation to serve all eligible people, states are guaranteed
funding for the federal share of all costs that flow from that obligation. If
enrollment rises, so does federal financial participation. It is difficult to imagine
how an entitlement program the size of Medicaid could be maintained by the
states without the open-ended federal commitment of federal funds and, at the
same time, it is difficult to imagine that the federal government would continue
to provide open-ended financing to states if states were not obligated to serve
all eligible people.
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the actual services-instead of mere funding-so that the benefit in
question is equally available to all. If this were not the rule, then
the entitlement nature of Medicaid would be irrelevant.
3 4
A more conservative argument can also be made: states should
be required to provide services, as opposed to mere funding, when
there is some indication that they are manipulating the federal
contribution formula in order to receive more funding, and this
manipulation results in some Medicaid recipients not receiving the
services for which they are eligible.15 In other words, the require-
ment that a state provide actual services (and not merely the
funding for those services) would need to be accompanied by an
element of self-interest at the state level. In sum, arguments can be
made supporting the definition of "medical assistance" as either the
provision of funding for medical services (the insurance approach)
or the provision of the actual services in question. The following
sections will propose solutions that encompass aspects from both of
these views.
B. Proposed Solution for Non-Waiver Cases
In cases that do not involve waivers, a blanket rule should not be
created. The Bruggeman decision provides an example of such a
rule:
[T]he statutory reference to "assistance" appears to have
reference to financial assistance rather than to actual medical
services, though the distinction was missed in Bryson v.
Shumway and Doe v. Chiles. Medicaid is a payment scheme, not
a scheme for state-provided medical assistance, as through
state-owned hospitals. The regulations that implement the
provision indicate that what is required is a prompt determina-
tion of eligibility and prompt provision of funds to eligible
individuals to enable them to obtain the covered medical
134. See id.
135. See Rosenbaum & Rousseau, supra note 8, at 25 ("[O]ver the years states have done
a remarkable job at manipulating the federal Medicaid contribution formula to create actual
federal contribution levels far higher than the level to which they might therefore be entitled
under the nominal statutory formula.").
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services that they need; a requirement of prompt treatment
would amount to a direct regulation of medical services.'36
This decision attempts to establish a rule that states should be
required to provide only funds, not services, under Medicaid.
Although such a rule will probably apply to the majority of cases
involving this issue, it could result in injustice under certain facts.
For example, assume that a state decides to include the optional
benefit X in its Medicaid program. It does so, however, with the
knowledge that current medical facilities have only the capacity to
accommodate two-thirds of the individuals who will be eligible for
benefit X. The remaining one-third of those eligible are put on a
waiting list for an indefinite period of time. The state has decided
to include the new benefit regardless of the need for a waiting list
because the federal funds that it will receive will help support its
public welfare budget.137 Although this in itself may be a good-faith
effort by the state to deal with a genuine problem, it will result in
a known inequity. The rule espoused in Bruggeman would not help
the people who remain on the waiting list-one-third of eligible
recipients-despite the fact that the state receives funds for a
benefit that it is required to make available to all eligible individu-
als.1
38
In fact, under such a rule, § 1396a(a)(1O) 13 9 would have no effect.
Making funding available to people who are eligible for a benefit
but who are unable to receive it would be useless if those individu-
als were never to receive the services for which the funding is
designated. 'Medical assistance," therefore, as used in § 1396a(a)(8)
would have to be given a definition that includes "the provision of
services" in order for § 1396a(a)(10) to have any effect in certain
cases.
The court's statement in Bruggeman,4 ° however, contains some
valid concerns regarding a universal definition of "medical assis-
tance" that requires the provisions of services. The "direct regula-
136. Bruggeman v. Blagojevich, 324 F.3d 906, 910 (7th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
137. See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
138. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10) (2000) ("A State plan for medical assistance must ...
provide ... for making medical assistance available ... to ... all [eligible] individuals.....
139. Id.
140. See supra text accompanying note 107.
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tion of medical services," or the necessity of state-owned hospitals,
could be the unintended result of a rule that requires the definition
of "medical assistance" to always include the provision of
services."' A definition of "medical assistance" that requires the
provision of services, therefore, should not be applied in all cases.
As a result of these two competing definitions-each with valid
support and each with valid concerns--courts should adopt a rule
for defining "medical assistance" in cases that involve non-waiver
Medicaid programs that focuses on the individual facts of each case.
The state should have the burden of establishing that it would be
substantially more demanding for it to provide the necessary
services than it would be for the plaintiff to remain on the waiting
list. This rule would encompass both the entitlement nature of
Medicaid because it would presume that the plaintiff is entitled to
the medical assistance at issue, and Bruggeman's concern for not
imposing an unintended hardship on the state.
C. Proposed Solution for Waiver Cases
In cases that involve a Medicaid waiver provision (waiver
programs),'42 the distinction between the two views of "medical
assistance" becomes vital. Courts should not require states to
provide services for benefits that are included within a waiver
provision, absent fraud or intentional misconduct. It is important
for states to be able to maximize the potential benefits that may
result from waiver programs.'43 Requiring a state to provide these
services could cause the program to go bankrupt, eliminating any
possible health care advances that may have been discovered or
created. '
141. See Bruggeman, 324 F.3d at 910.
142. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c) (describing Medicaid waiver program procedures and
requirements).
143. See, e.g., Bryson v. Shumway, 308 F.3d 79, 82 (1st Cir. 2002) ("The waiver program
is designed to allow states to experiment with methods of care, or to provide care on a
targeted basis, without adhering to the strict mandates of the Medicaid system.").
144. For a discussion of current problems with waiver programs, see Mann &
Westmoreland, supra note 11, at 422-23.
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Also, courts should not require states under a waiver program to
fill any vacancies that have been approved but not filled.145 For
example, if a state applies for a program that allows 150 people to
participate, but chooses to accept only 100 people into the program,
it should not be required to provide services to the additional fifty
people. Doing so would dissuade states from setting high goals. In
other words, if a state would prefer to eventually include 150 people
in the program, but currently has the financial ability to provide the
services to only 100 people, it should be allowed to serve those 100
people without the fear of being forced to fill the program. In fact,
this type of behavior should be encouraged, not punished.'46 By
requiring the state to provide the service to all 150 individuals, a
court may end up causing the entire program to end. This is exactly
the risk that the court created in Bryson v. Shumway.'47
If a court determines that a state has abused the Medicaid
waiver provisions, then it should require the state to take appropri-
ate measures to correct the abuse. The plaintiff, however, should
bear the burden of proving the abuse. Again, this test is in line with
the view that waiver programs should be encouraged and sup-
ported.
CONCLUSION
The issue of individual enforceability of Medicaid benefits under
§ 1983 is not likely to disappear any time soon. Indeed, there has
been much debate on whether such a right should exist in the first
place. 4" When courts do decide that an individually enforceable
right to Medicaid exists, they also need to decide what remedy that
enforceable right provides. Awarding a plaintiff "medical assis-
tance" is of little use without guidance as to what that phrase
means. Recent circuit court decisions are likely to spark further
debate on this topic; a resolution, however, is needed. Courts must
145. An example of this requirement is seen in Bryson v. Shumway, 308 F.3d 79, 81 (1st
Cir. 2002). See supra Part .B.
146. See, e.g., Bryson, 308 F.3d at 82-83 (noting that states possess economic reasons for
creating and slowly developing waiver programs). "[W]aiver programs may be costly to the
states .... The states thus have a financial incentive to keep their waiver programs small, or
at least, to begin with small programs and grow them incrementally." Id.
147. See supra Part III.B.
148. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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develop a standard that defines the scope of "medical assistance."
Without such a standard, courts will be distracted by this issue,
litigation will be prolonged, and Medicaid recipients may not
receive the assistance to which they are entitled.
A blanket rule that defines "medical assistance" as the provision
of services or as the provision of funding for services is not practical.
This is because the facts of each case presenting this issue will not
be the same, and it is likely that a court will use a definition that
may apply to one set of facts, but may not fit as well to another set
of facts. Such a situation is demonstrated by comparing Doe v.
Chiles and Bryson v. Shumway with Bruggeman v. Blagojevich.
Courts, therefore, should develop a standard that considers the
individual facts of each case. The burden should then be placed
upon the state to prove that it would be more taxing for it to provide
actual services than it would be for the plaintiff to remain on the
waiting list.
On the other hand, when a state adopts a waiver program that
has been approved by the appropriate regulatory body, the court
should grant wide latitude concerning how that program is
administered. Absent fraud or intentional misconduct, states should
not be required to provide eligible Medicaid recipients with services
under these programs. Doing so would only frustrate the purpose
for which the programs were created, thus slowing the possible
progression in health care that may result. As society advances, so
should the quality and breadth of treatment options for America's
poor.
In the end, this Note does not suggest that the proposals made
herein are the only possible ways to address this issue. Rather, the
important lesson is that courts, in the absence of further congressio-
nal action on this issue, need to adopt standards that give rightful
plaintiffs some direction. Considering that plaintiffs in these cases
qualify for Medicaid, it can be assumed that they do not have the
means to pursue lengthy litigation. In addition to an initial trial,
possibly followed by an appeal, the plaintiffs, without the guidance
of any uniform standard, might subsequently be forced to pursue
additional litigation in order to find out their exact remedy under
an enforceable right to Medicaid. This surely cannot be what
Congress envisioned when it created the Medicaid Act.
Kenneth R. Wiggins
1512 [Vol. 47:1487
